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Previous studies have suggested that more liberal abortion laws should lead to a decrease in 
marriage rates among young women as ‘shotgun weddings’ are no longer necessary. 
Empirical evidence from the United States lends support to that hypothesis. This paper 
presents an alternative theory of abortion access and marriage based on asymmetric 
information, which suggests that more liberal abortion laws may actually promote young 
marriage. An empirical examination of marriage data from Eastern Europe shows that 
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“For us women, it’s really a limited window. We know that boys who grow up to become 
men don’t necessarily want to be men. They like to be boys. And so women say, ‘You know 
what? He’s gonna just have to snap out of it - and my pregnancy will be the thing to do it.’ 
 
         Vicki Iovine, author of The Girlfriends' Guide to Pregnancy. 
 
 
Economists have long understood how changes in social policy can alter the incentives of 
individual and group actions leading to behavioural responses.  One such social policy is the 
restrictions a society places on a person’s ability to terminate a pregnancy.  Changes in such 
restrictions can alter both male and female incentives to engage in premarital sex, to seek 
premarital commitments and to enter marriage itself. 
Previous theoretical work has generally assumed that liberalizing abortion laws would 
lead to a decrease in marriage rates among young women from the subsequent decline in 
‘shotgun weddings.’ This paper presents a competing theory that focuses on the nature of the 
asymmetric information problem in the mating game.  If pregnancy is an effective information 
revelation mechanism, liberalization of abortion laws can reduce the cost of, and speed up the 
process of, learning and lead to increased marriage rates among young women. We test the 
implications of this theory empirically by examining a period of rapid change in abortion 
restrictions in Eastern Europe and the effect these changes had on the marriage rates of women.  
We find that, contrary to the predictions of the perceived theory, more liberal abortion laws have 
been associated with increases in female marriage rates for non-teenage women.  
Several previous economic studies investigate the relationship between abortion access 
and marriage in the United States. In Akerlof, et al. (1996), for instance, increased availability of 
abortion is theorized to lead to a decline in marriage rates among females for two reasons. First, 
  1 since abortion now acts as a form of ‘insurance policy’, women no longer need to insist upon a 
marriage promise, in the event of pregnancy, as a precondition for premarital sex. Second, with 
increased access to abortion, males may feel less responsibility to marry their partners in the 
event of an unplanned pregnancy since fertility is now a decision on their part. For both reasons, 
increased access to abortion should lead to lower incidence of ‘shotgun weddings,’ or weddings 
that occur due to an unplanned pregnancy.
 1  This theory states then that a decrease in forced 
marriages due to unplanned pregnancies should lead to more delays in first marriage as abortion 
laws are liberalized, and lower first marriage rates among women across the entire fertility age 
range (15 to 44 years-old).              
The present study proposes a competing theory of abortion access and marriage which 
extends the work of Kane and Staiger (1996), who argue that pregnancy reveals information 
about the attractiveness of parenthood and abortion provides insurance in case that information is 
negative. It is suggested that a woman considering the suitability of a potential mate for marriage 
can learn through two channels; slowly gathering information through time, or becoming 
pregnant and therefore learning quickly, provided she can terminate the pregnancy if the 
information is negative. A switch to a liberal abortion regime might make the pregnancy route 
less costly, speed up the learning process on average and, in contrast to the Akerlof et al. (1996) 
theory, raise first marriage rates among women. Thus the precise effect of abortion laws on 
marriage outcomes is an empirical question. 
                                                 
1 Chiappori and Oreffice (2008) argue that for Akerlof et al.’s theory to hold, it must be the case that a significant 
proportion of the male population in the U.S. chose to remain single over this time period, but would have decided 
(or been forced) to marry had legal abortion not been available. To examine empirically whether legalization of 
abortion significantly increased the probability of singlehood in the male population, they use data on males aged 15 
to 50 from the Current Population Survey March Supplements 1968-1980 and regress a male singlehood dummy on 
age, education, race and fixed effects by year and state, as well as an abortion legalization dummy for the different 
states. They find that the abortion dummy is not statistically significant and the coefficient has a negative sign.      
  2 There are a few additional previous empirical studies that address similar questions as the 
present study. Goldin and Katz (2002) argue that access to the birth control pill in the U.S. in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s lowered the marriage market cost to young women who delayed 
marriage in order to pursue a career and they find some evidence that birth control as well as 
abortion access resulted in delayed marriage for young women. Two other studies exploit the 
cross-state variation in abortion access in U.S. states in the early 1970s to examine the effects on 
marriage rates. Evans and Angrist (1999) find a negative effect of abortion liberalization on the 
probability that a white woman married by the age of twenty. Choo and Siow (2006) find a 
negative effect of partial legalization of abortion on marriage rates for both young men and 
women. Rasul (2003) and Alesina and Giuliano (2007) examine the impact of adoption of 
unilateral divorce laws in the U.S. on marriage rates, but also control for the liberalization of 
abortion laws. Rasul (2003) reports a statistically significant negative relationship between 
abortion legalization and marriage rates. Alesina and Guiliano (2007) also report a negative 
relationship, although their finding is not statistically significant.      
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides a more detailed comparison of the 
theories exploring the relationship between abortion access and marriage. Section 2 contains a 
descriptive overview of the data used in the paper’s empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the 
study’s methodology and results. Section 4 outlines the conclusions of the paper.        
 
1. Abortion laws and entry into marriage: the theoretical framework   
To understand how abortion access affects entry into marriage, the decision to engage in 
sexual intercourse by unmarried women is first examined. In a traditional economic framework, 
an unmarried woman is assumed to evaluate the costs and benefits of sexual activities before 
  3 engaging in sexual intercourse with a man (Posner, 1992; Levine, 2000; Klick and Stratman, 
2006). One of the most obvious drawbacks is the possibility of an unplanned pregnancy 
occurring, which is associated with considerable costs. On the one hand, there are several direct 
costs, including the monetary costs attached to giving birth to and raising a child. On the other 
hand, there are also indirect costs to consider. For example, an unplanned pregnancy may result 
in a woman having to forego opportunities in education and in the labour market (Angrist and 
Evans, 1996) and may also generate social or familial opprobrium. This raises the possibility that 
a woman (and her partner) may be ‘forced’ into a shotgun wedding (that is, marriage that takes 
place after pregnancy occurs, but before the birth of the child). Access to abortion can eliminate 
these costs by eliminating their source (although replacing them with the actual financial and 
emotional cost of the abortion itself).     
To fix ideas, consider a simple game. The player of this game is a single woman who 
wishes to find a man to marry and have a child with. She obtains some value from the process of 
dating and we denote this value as V. In the first move she receives a random draw of a man who 
can be either a ‘Dad,’ also interested in marriage and parenthood, or a ‘Cad,’ someone who only 
wants to date and does not want marriage or a child. The proportion of Dads in the population is 
denotedφ, and thus the proportion of Cads is 1-φ. Once the draw is made the woman does not 
know what type of man she has ended up with and therefore the decision node has a single 
information set.  
There are two ways the woman can find out the man’s type: she can wait and through the 
process of dating learn his type, or she can get pregnant and learn his type immediately through 
his reaction to the pregnancy. Once she waits and learns the true type she can dump the man or 
get pregnant in which case she will either be a single mom (if his type is Cad) or a married 
  4 mother (if his type is Dad). If she uses pregnancy to reveal the information she can remain 
pregnant or abort.   
We denote the full cost of an abortion (inclusive of all cost) as C. The value of single 
motherhood is S and the value of married motherhood is M. We assume that C>0, S<M, and 
S<V<M. The woman also has a discount factor for waiting a period, which is denotedδ. Thus, if 
she aborts, she re-enters the game the next period, so her payoff is δV. This discount factor 
could also be an increasing function of age during the period of fertility, but for present purposes 
we shall model it as independent of age. We illustrate the game with the following game tree. 
 
Figure 1  The Dads and Cads Game
  5 Abortion laws affect the cost of abortion, C. We have to examine two cases. This first case is 
when the cost of abortion is low enough such that V-C≥S, or once a woman receives a draw of a 
man, she can get pregnant to reveal type and will chose to abort in the case of a Cad. We call that 
the weak abortion law case. The second case is when the cost of abortion is so high such that V-
C < S, which means that the woman will choose to keep the baby even if the man is revealed to 
be a Cad. We call that the strict abortion law case. In either case, we assume that V-C<M, 
meaning that a woman will always choose to keep a baby if the man is revealed to be a Dad. 
Note that by assumption a (risk-neutral) woman who chooses to wait will receive an 
expected present value payoff of: V ) 1 ( M δ φ − + δφ .  Since V is defined as the value at the start of 
the game, we can solve this recursive problem for the value of V if the woman waits:  
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We can now calculate the payoff a woman receives from getting pregnant in both a weak 
abortion law regime and a strict abortion law regime. If a woman gets pregnant under a strict 
abortion law regime then the expected present value of this strategy is: 
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If a woman gets pregnant under a weak abortion law regime the expected present value of 
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  6 A woman will therefore choose to become pregnant and force information revelation if 
and only if: 
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M  in the weak case. 
 
In the strict case either strategy is possible, so once C is high enough such that V-C < S, 
any additional cost of abortion no longer has any effect on a woman’s decision to wait or get 
pregnant. It is therefore the weak case that is of interest to this analysis. It is immediately clear 
that in the weak case, the higher is C, or the less liberal are abortion laws, the less likely is a 
woman to employ the strategy of getting pregnant and the more likely she is to wait. Conversely, 
the more liberal are abortion laws, the more likely is a woman to get pregnant to find out a man’s 
type. The decision-tree in Figure 1 provides a summary of this game.   
As an extension, we can consider the discount factor δ as a function of the age of the 
woman, , where  ) age ( δ 0 ) age ( < δ′ . This reflects the fact that a woman’s fertile years are limited 
and the cost of repeating the game increases through time. Since ) age ( *
d
dV
) age ( d







, it must be the case that 0
) age ( d
dVW < , or that the woman is more likely to pursue the 
pregnancy strategy as she gets older.   
   In summary, a switch to a more liberal abortion law in the model can influence marriage 
rates because pregnancies will be affected. Specifically, every non-marital pregnancy will be 
  7 associated with a probability that the man will turn out to be a ‘Dad’ and therefore marry the 
woman before the child is born. Since more pregnancies are likely to take place, some of these 
will lead to marriage. Furthermore, the response time of women to the policy shift is likely to be 
fairly rapid in this game since their behaviour reflects changes in the woman’s own actions with 
little or no regard to the broader social environment. By contrast, in the Akerlof et al. (1996) 
game, social norms are required to change in response to the switch in abortion policy, since we 
observe effects on competition among women and bargaining power between men and women.          
The presence of competing theories of access to abortion and marriage suggests that the 
net effect of a more liberal abortion law on entry into marriage is an empirical issue. The next 
section presents an empirical investigation of abortion law liberalization in Eastern Europe and 
its effect on marriage rates among young women.   
 
2. Data description and methodology   
  8 
The economic and political transition in Eastern Europe of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
was associated with a drastic transformation in family life. The data show considerable changes 
in trends affecting families, such as an abrupt fall in total fertility rates but a corresponding steep 
rise in the proportion of extra-marital births. Single-parent families increased relative to all 
families and the average size of families and households dropped significantly. Further, there 
were major changes in patterns of union formation, as marriage rates declined to very low levels 
and individuals postponed marriage to a later age.  These trends took place against the backdrop 
of radical changes in social policy in Eastern Europe. For example, over the transitional period of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, several countries made amendments to laws relating to access to 
abortion. For most countries in the region, this took the form of eliminating varying degrees of restrictions that existed under the former communist regime, although one country (Poland) 
tightened abortion laws even further. Those countries, mainly from the former Soviet Republic, 
which already had in place fairly liberal abortion laws prior to the transitional period, did not 
significantly change their policies relating to abortion.  
The analysis that follows uses data from twelve Eastern European countries over the 
1980 to 1997 period to estimate the empirical relationship between changes in different types of 
abortion policies and female entry into marriage.
2 Eastern Europe is a very useful area to study in 
this respect since, as mentioned above, both regions experienced both sweeping and diverse 
changes in abortion laws over those two decades. Further, the issue of whether these changes 
affected the propensity to marry has not been addressed in the literature.
3
To examine the impact of changes in abortion policy on entry into marriage, regression 
models were estimated with each outcome considered as a function of the legal status of 
abortion, macroeconomic conditions (GDP and inflation), economic and social development 
(female university enrolment and urbanization) and marriage market conditions (female to male 
population ratios and divorce laws). The outcomes considered are the female first marriage rates 
per 1000 females for the following age groups: 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, and 40-44.  
          The data for the dependent variables are taken from various issues of the Council of 
Europe’s Demographic Yearbook.  
 
 
                                                 
2 The twelve countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia and Slovak Republic.  
3 The data on abortion laws were provided by Doug Staiger and Phillip Levine who have examined the effect of 
these laws on a range of fertility outcomes in Eastern Europe: Levine, P. and D. Staiger (2004), ‘Abortion Policy 
and Fertility Outcomes: The Eastern European Experience’, Journal of Law and Economics, 47, 1, 223-243.   
 
  9 2.1 Descriptive analysis of outcome measures     
Over the time period under examination in this paper, traditional patterns of early and 
universal entry into marriage for females were broken in Eastern Europe, a process that 
continues today. Table 1 presents mean values of this study’s outcome measures in Eastern 
Europe weighted by the relevant population measure in each country in 1980 and 1995. For 
comparative purposes, statistics are also reported for Western Europe. The raw data show 
patterns that are broadly similar in both regions for young women but different for older women. 
In 1980, the female marriage rates were generally higher than those of 1995 for young women in 
both Eastern and Western Europe although the magnitude of the decline was considerably 
greater in Western Europe.  For older women the patterns diverge.  The marriage rates for older 
women in Eastern Europe declined while those in Western Europe increased.  
 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show first marriage rates for 25-29 year olds for the former soviet 
republics and for the rest of the Eastern European countries respectively. These figures illustrate 
the changes in marriage rates experienced by those aged 25 to 29 in those countries that did not 
change their abortion laws during the entire period under study (the former soviet republics) and 
those countries that liberalised their abortion laws (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, 
Hungary and Romania). Figure 2 shows the downward trend in female first marriage rates in the 
soviet republics over the 1980 to 1997 period, while Figure 3 shows that female first marriage 
rates increased significantly in the early 1990s. This behavioural shift closely coincides with the 
political and economic turmoil brought about by the decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet 
Union, but it also took place around the time of abortion law changes in these countries.   
 
 
  10  2.2 Description of Abortion Laws 
Abortion laws in the countries of Eastern Europe are currently among the most liberal in 
the world. In the 1950s, the republics of the former Soviet Union made abortion available on 
request during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. In the more recent past, several other Eastern 
European countries, with the exception of Poland, continued to liberalise their abortion laws, 
although several restrictive aspects of these laws remain in place. Table A1 of the Appendix 
presents an overview of these laws in Eastern Europe and highlights the changes that have been 
implemented since 1980. 
The legal status of abortion in each country at a given point in time is placed into one of 
three categories:
4
(1)  “life/medical” – abortion is only granted in order to save the life of the woman or 
if she suffers from ‘specific, narrow medical’ conditions; 
(2)  “medical/social” – abortion is available if the woman suffers from a broader range 
of medical problems, including mental health issues, or if it is deemed that hardship would 
follow from the birth of the child; and  
(3)  “on request” – abortion is available to a women if she asks for one.  
Over the eighteen-year period examined in this paper, there have been a number of 
changes made to the fundamental legal status of abortion in the Eastern European countries 
featured in Table A1, particularly by those who were not part of the former Soviet Union. Some 
of these changes coincided with the movement from communism and democracy in the regions 
and the abandonment of pro-natalist policies. For example, following the overthrow of dictator 
Nicolae Ceausescu in late 1989, Romania repealed the 1966 and 1986 decrees restricting access 
to abortion. Similarly, in early 1990, Bulgaria made abortion available on request to all women 
                                                 
4 This categorization is taken from Levine and Staiger (2004). 
  11  in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, thereby overturning laws passed in 1968 and 1973 which 
restricted eligibility for abortion to unmarried women and married women with children.  
However, there are countries in Eastern Europe which liberalised abortion laws prior to 
the transitional period of the 1990s. For example, in 1987, six years prior to its split into two 
republics, Czechoslovakia made abortion available upon request, ending a 30 year-old law which 
permitted abortion only on medical or social grounds. Not long after the country divided into the 
Czech and Slovak republics, considerable fees for abortions were introduced. Similar changes 
were made to Hungarian abortion law in 1993.  
The former GDR has been subject to changes in abortion law since German unification. 
In 1995, several new procedural requirements were introduced, including a three-day waiting 
period and mandatory counselling to dissuade the woman from having an abortion. Further, most 
abortions in the ex-GDR are no longer covered by national health insurance (Rahman et al., 
1998).      
Poland represents the only country in our sample to have significantly tightened access to 
abortion in the transitional period of the 1990s. Restrictions on funding of abortion began in the 
spring of 1990, and by 1993, the Polish government, backed by the Catholic Church, had 
succeeded in overturning the country’s liberal abortion law which had been in place since 1956. 
The new law limited abortion to cases of threat to the mother’s life or health, cases of rape and 
incest, and serious and irreversible damage to the foetus. 
As noted at the beginning of this section, access to abortion in the republics of the former 
Soviet Union has been available on request both before and after the transition from communism 
to democracy. The first major change occurred two years after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, 
when abortion prohibition that had been in force since 1936 was abandoned. In 1988, abortion 
  12  laws were further liberalised, with an extension of the termination period and consideration of a 
broader range of non-medical issues in the decision.    
 
2.3 Description of control variables   
2.3.1 Macroeconomic conditions 
Macroeconomic conditions in Eastern Europe are important controls to include in the 
analysis. First, they are likely to be correlated with political developments that led to changes in 
abortion laws in Eastern Europe over the 1980 to 1997 period. Second, there are several 
mechanisms through which an economic crisis (as experienced by almost all the Eastern 
European countries included in the study period) could either hasten or postpone marriage. To 
begin with, it has the potential to increase the gains from marriage. For example, the uncertainty 
associated with an economic crisis enhances the attractiveness of the resource pooling and 
insurance functions of marriage. In other words, married individuals can reap the benefits of 
economies of scale, and relationships formed through marriage can extend family networks and 
facilitate income and consumption smoothing (Rosenzweig, 1998, 1993). On the other hand, an 
economic crisis may be associated with delayed marriage. The search for a spouse may be longer 
and more costly in a period of uncertainty since wage declines and reduced economic prospects 
make partners less marriageable. Further, females may delay marriage so that childbearing can 
be postponed, particularly in societies found in Eastern Europe where first births follow soon 
after marriage (Nobles and Buttenheim, 2006). 
To capture the extent of the crisis (and subsequent recovery), the specific measures of 
macroeconomic conditions included in the analysis are the natural log of per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) and a set of dummy variables representing varying levels of inflation 
  13  (less than 5 per cent, between 5 and 25 per cent, between 25 and 100 per cent, and greater than 
100 per cent). The figures which cover the transitional period of the 1990s were obtained from 
the World Bank
5, whilst those relating to the communist period of the 1980s were taken from 
estimates made by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
6        
 As Table A2 shows, during the transitional period of the late-80s and early-90s, virtually 
all of the Eastern European countries included in our sample experienced huge declines in real 
GDP per capita. Further, eight of the twelve countries featured in Table A3 were subject to 
inflation of greater than 100 per cent in several years during the 1990s.  
 
2.3.2 Economic and social development  
Female enrolment in higher education is included as a control since the opportunity cost 
of completing studies in a marital setting may be high. Further, once education is completed, the 
opportunity cost of marriage and related child bearing is higher for more educated female 
workers. Indeed, a huge expansion of female enrolment in higher education in Eastern Europe 
took place following the collapse of communism.  
Table A4 shows the percentage of females aged 20-24 who were enrolled in university 
education in 1980 and 1995 (UNESCO). Although there is a fairly large amount of missing data 
for this variable, the table does highlight the rapid growth in female participation in university 
                                                 
5 Levine and Staiger (2004) note that it is difficult to obtain data for separate regions within a country, for example, 
the former German Demographic Republic and the former Czechoslovakia. Separate estimates for the German 
eastern regions of the level of GDP were able to be obtained, but for previous years, we follow Levine and Staiger 
(2004) and calculate the level of GDP using the more recent data combined with CIA estimates of GDP growth rates 
in earlier years. Inflation data for 1992 onwards were taken from the German Statistical Office and 1980 to 1989 
data were obtained from CIA estimates. Data for 1990 and 1991 are missing. For the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
separate GDP figures over the 1984 to 1997 period were obtained from the World Bank, but for previous years, we 
again follow Levine and Staiger (2004) and assign the GDP growth rates from the combined Czechoslovakia to the 
1984 levels of GDP to project backward. It is also assumed that inflation in the two republics were the same prior to 
their separation.          
6 Some countries and years have missing data for these macroeconomic variables, even using the CIA estimates. To 
include these countries in the analysis, we follow Levine and Staiger (2004) and add dummy variables for both GDP 
and inflation measures to indicate whether or not these data are missing.  
  14  education in the regions. For example, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland have all experienced more 
than 100 per cent increases in female enrolment at universities. The only country in the sample 
which has observed a decline is Lithuania. Between 1985 and 1995, female enrolment at 
universities declined by more than 25 per cent.             
A measure of urbanization (the proportion of people living in urban areas) was also 
included as a control in the analysis. Economic development may be expected to change the 
benefits and costs of marriage. For example, urbanization may generate new economic 
opportunities that provide an attractive alternative to early marriage. On the other hand, 
urbanization may also lower search costs leading to an increase in early marriage.  
Table A5 shows that most of the Eastern European countries have experienced increased 
urbanization over the 1982 to 1997 period. The greatest increases in urbanization were 
experienced by Romania (13.4 per cent) and Hungary (11.3 per cent). Three countries in the 
sample (Estonia, GDR, and Moldova) observed small declines in urbanization. 
 
2.3.3 Marriage market conditions  
To capture the demographic availability of potential male spouses, the female-to-male 
population ratio in each country is included as a control. Theory would suggest that the 
probability of a female being married increases directly with the demographic supply of men to 
wed. Therefore, one should expect that the higher the female-to-male population ratio, the lower 
the female marriage rate. Table A6 shows the respective ratios between 1980 and 1996 for each 
Eastern European country included in the sample. Although there appears to be little variation 
across countries and through time, it is noticeable that in virtually all countries the older age 
groups (35 to 39 and 40 to 44) have female-to-male population ratios greater than one, indicating 
  15  that there is an excess supply of women. Of course, this female-to-male population ratio 
represents only a crude approximation on two grounds. First, females typically marry older men 
and second, it is the eligible sex ratio (in terms of unmarried men and women) that matters most 
for the marriage market and is the theoretically correct measure, adjusted for differences in age at 
marriage. Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain data on the latter.       
Divorce laws were controlled for in the analysis since they too might be expected to 
affect entry into marriage. On the one hand, liberal divorce laws might encourage marriage since 
the law acts as a cheap form of ‘insurance policy’ should a marriage prove to an unhappy one.  In 
other words, liberal divorce laws reduce the cost of exiting an unhappy marriage, so individuals 
may be encouraged to enter marriage more easily, particularly those who plan to have children 
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2007). On the other hand, liberal divorce laws may reduce the incentives 
for spouses to undertake marriage-specific investment, such as buying a house together 
(Stevenson, 2007). In turn, this will reduce the ex ante value of marriage and reduce marriage 
rates, all else equal.
7 
In this study, the following two-fold categorisation of divorce laws is adopted: 
(1)  Strict, institutionalised divorce laws - divorce permitted on the grounds of fault or 
other major disruption of marital life. Institutionalisation of marriage remains the leading 
principle, and the divorce process is hard and lengthy;  
(2)  Less strict, more individual-based divorce laws - divorce permitted on grounds of 
less restrictive legislation. Shows more understanding for the will of the spouses.  
                                                 
7 Empirical evidence from the United States suggests that the adoption of unilateral divorce laws by many states in 
the 1970s has led to a significant and permanent decline in marriage rates (see Brinig and Grafton, 1994; Rasul, 
2003). 
 
  16  Data on divorce laws of each country were obtained from Martiny and Schwab (2003), 
Todorova (2003), Antokolskaia (2003), Weiss and Szeibert (2003), Maczynski and Sokolowski 
(2003), Harkonen and Dronkers (2006), the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, and 
through direct correspondence with legal experts in Eastern Europe. Table A7 shows that 
throughout the period under study, the majority of the Eastern European countries included in the 
sample have operated under Category (2) divorce laws. However, Bulgaria, the former GDR, and  
Romania experienced switches in divorce laws over the study period. In Bulgaria, the 1985 
Family Code restored fault as a ground for divorce that represents a shift to Category (1) in the 
divorce coding. Meanwhile, in Romania, the 1993 Family Code introduced no-fault divorce, that 
represents a movement into Category (2). 
The case of the former GDR is less straightforward. Between 1949 and 1990, the former 
GDR and West Germany followed widely differing approaches to divorce laws. Engelhardt et al. 
(2002) note that the combination of low costs, shorter waiting times, and greater simplicity of the 
procedure meant that divorce in East Germany was less stigmatizing and stress-producing 
compared to West Germany. Following unification, however, all divorce laws in the West were 
made applicable in the territory of the East. Whilst it would be incorrect to argue that this 
uniform divorce law is strict and institutionalised per se, for the purpose of this analysis it is 
reasonable to assume that the ex-GDR’s adoption of West German divorce law in 1990 
represented a shift toward a more restrictive divorce law regime.  
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis that follows are found in Table 
3. Several important econometric issues will now be addressed.       
 
 
  17  2.3.4 Econometric methodology  
The data used in the analysis are a panel of 208 observations that include twelve Eastern 
European countries for the years 1980 through 1997. Given that the data have time series and 
cross-section components, the analysis relies on changes in the legal status of abortion laws on 
marriage rates in these twelve countries. In the model specifications employed in the analysis, 
country fixed-effects are included to control for time-invariant differences in marriage rates 
across countries. These differences may relate, for example, to history, culture and other 
institutional arrangements. Time fixed-effects are also included to control for year-over-year 
changes common to each country. For instance, the timing of the decline and collapse of the 
Soviet Union undoubtedly had an impact on the twelve countries included in the study’s sample. 
To capture unobservable factors that may be evolving over time at different paces in 
different countries, country-specific trends are included in two model specifications. One 
potential criticism of this approach, however, is that such models might “overfit” the data, 
thereby reducing the power of the analysis (Blank, 2001). The results are presented both with 
and without these trends to examine the sensitivity of their inclusion. In models without these 
trends, identification is provided by those countries that changed their abortion laws over the 
period under study. In models with the trends, identification is based on the discrete nature of the 
change in abortion laws and the change in marital outcomes right around the time of the change 
in abortion laws. The following model was estimated using OLS: 
ε γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ β β α
+ + +
+ + + + + + + =
i i t
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i
trend country year
urban femenroll lation GDP onreq restrict mrate
7 6 5
, 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 , inf
 
where mrate is the female first-marriage rate for the different age categories for country i in year 
; restrict and onreq are indicator variables that equal one if the country had a restrictive  t
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inflation, femenroll, and urban are the GDP per capita, the inflation rate categorical dummy 
variables, the female university enrolment rate and the percentage of the population living in 
urban areas, respectively, for country i in year t. Finally, year, country and trend are the year 
dummies, the country dummies and the country-specific trends (either linear or quadratic).   
i
          The estimation of each model assumes that any switch in abortion laws was exogenous to 
the differences across countries in social problems that were occurring at the same time and that 
may also have been associated with changes in marriage rates. It is possible that these social 
problems that were largely borne out of the economic transition process partly drove countries 
with restrictive abortion laws to change them in response to, for example, greater fertility 
control. However, the timing of the changes in abortion laws provides some variation in policies 
across countries that are not directly related to the period of the most dramatic social turmoil.                
          In all specifications, the omitted abortion law dummy is ‘medical and social conditions’, 
so the results are interpreted as the effect of imposing severe or liberal abortion restrictions 
relative to having a more moderate regime in place.  
 
3. Results  
3.1. Main findings  
The effect of abortion’s legal status on marriage rates of females for different age groups 
was examined in the empirical analysis. Table 3 presents estimates from models where the 
dependent variable is the first marriage rate of females aged 15 to 19 in Eastern Europe. The 
specification shown in Column 1 includes two abortion law dummies (representing ‘strict’ and 
‘liberal’ laws), macroeconomic conditions, and country and year fixed effects. Columns 2 and 3 
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factors that may be related to both marriage rates and abortion law reforms. Column 4 adds 
controls that capture measures of economic and social development as well as marriage market 
conditions.   
Columns 1 and 4 indicate that the marriage rate is lower in countries where abortion is 
available upon request compared to countries in which abortion is only available for medical and 
social conditions. Estimates from both specifications indicate that liberal abortion laws decrease 
marriage rates among teenagers by around 50 marriages per 1000 women. This seems to lend 
support to the Akerlof et al. (1996) theory discussed earlier, which suggests that a switch to more 
liberal abortion laws will lead to a decline in shotgun weddings. However, the introduction of 
country-specific trends in Columns 2 and 3 results in a change in the sign of the coefficient, and 
remains statistically significant in the specification with linear trends. 
Meanwhile, the results reported in Tables 4 and 5 for the ‘twenty-somethings’ reveal a 
remarkably consistent story. Across all specifications, the coefficient on the liberal abortion law 
dummy is positive and strongly statistically significant. For females aged 20 to 24, the effect of 
imposing a liberal abortion law is estimated at 17.5 to 62.2 additional marriages per 1000 
women, whilst for those aged 25 to 29, the impact is estimated at 9.5 to 27.7 additional 
marriages.  
Table 6 shows that for females aged 30 to 34, the adoption of liberal abortion laws in 
which abortion is available upon request also increases marriage rates relative to a regime where 
it is available for medical and social reasons only. However, the size of the coefficient is fairly 
small across all specifications and the introduction of country-specific linear trends (Column 2) 
lowers the estimate to the point where it is no longer statistically significant. The coefficients on 
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respectively) are positive and statistically significant in Columns 1 and 4, but are sensitive to the 
inclusion of both country-specific linear and quadratic trends. 
Table 7 also shows that, for females aged 35 to 39, the coefficient on the strict abortion 
dummy is positive and statistically significant in Columns 1 to 3, indicating that marriage rates 
for this age group increase following the adoption of laws where abortion is only available to 
save the mother’s life or for other specific medical reasons. This may be consistent with 
expectations that shotgun weddings become more prevalent when abortion laws are tightened in 
a country. Lack of precision of these estimates may be due to the fact that overall marriage rates 
are quite low for females over thirty leaving less variation to identify from.     
Turning to the findings for the controls used in the analysis, a number of broadly 
consistent results emerge. In terms of the macroeconomic conditions, greater levels of GDP per 
capita are generally associated with higher female first marriage rates. Economic growth is likely 
to be accompanied by employment creation and may therefore imply some improvement in the 
pool of economically attractive men for women to marry. In addition, high rates of inflation (in 
particular, greater than 100 per cent) tend to be associated with higher female first marriage rates 
compared to low rates of inflation (less than 5 per cent). Hyperinflation may be a reflection of an 
economic crisis that may, as noted earlier, increase the attractiveness of marriage as a means of 
pooling resources and insuring against loss.        
As for the measures of economic and social development, higher levels of female 
enrolment in university education are, as expected, associated with lower first marriage rates. 
However, there are asymmetrical effects observed across age groups relating to the impact of 
urbanization on marriage rates. A greater rate of urbanization is associated with higher marriage 
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and 44. One possible explanation is that greater urbanization implies a larger potential supply of 
male spouses in the marriage market, thus resulting in females marrying at an earlier age. 
Finally, turning to marriage market conditions, the findings suggest that restrictive 
divorce laws are associated with higher marriage rates for females aged between 30 and 44. The 
implication here is that an older woman in particular may feel more secure about entering 
marriage if the divorce law regime reduces the probability of her being an unwilling party to 
divorce. This is also related to the more general idea that a woman tends to be valued less in the 
remarriage market than a male of similar age (Cohen, 1987).  
Less easily explained are the results relating to the study’s other measure of marriage 
market conditions, namely, female-to-male population ratios. Across several age groups, 
statistically significant coefficients are reported, but the signs are not all in the same direction. 
For example, for females aged 20-24, a higher ratio is associated with lower female marriage 
rates, which is in line with expectations. On the other hand, for those aged 15-19, 20-24 and 30-
34, a higher ratio is associated with higher marriage rates, which goes against economic theory. 
However, given that this control is only a very crude approximation of the female-to-male 
population ratio, it is perhaps not surprising that it is not a strongly performing variable due to 
the measurement issues noted earlier.    
In summary, the results presented in this section provide strong evidence that the status of 
abortion laws has a large impact on the female marriage rate. In particular, the estimates reported 
for ‘twenty-something’ females indicate that making abortion available upon request is 
associated with an increase in the marriage rate. This lends some support to the theory that 
suggests that, under a liberal abortion regime, females may adopt a strategy of ‘learning through 
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the findings of Levine and Staiger (2004) who report that, over the same 1980 to 1997 period in 
Eastern Europe, a switch from moderate restrictions to abortion available upon request was 
associated with no change in births despite large increases in abortions, indicating that 
pregnancies increased following more liberal access to abortion. As argued earlier, if more 
pregnancies take place, some of these will turn into marriage.       
 
3.2 Robustness  checks 
One concern with the model specifications adopted in the analysis is that they do not 
explicitly capture the collapse of communism that was common across the twelve countries 
included in the study’s sample. In an attempt to understand the extent to which this mattered for 
female marriage rates, all four specifications were modified to include either a level shift 
“political shock” dummy (set to 1 from 1990 onwards) or a time trend (set to 0 until 1990 and 
then incrementing onwards). The results (not shown) were not overly sensitive to the inclusion of 
these dummy variables.  
Another worry might be that only a few countries are driving most of the results. 
Therefore, the regressions were estimated dropping one individual country at a time and the 
general results did not change significantly. However, for the teenage age group, the exclusion of 
Hungary from the sample resulted in the sign on the ‘liberal’ abortion dummy being negative 
across all model specifications, although conventional levels of significance were still not 
reached once country-specific trends were added.      
Finally, the initial estimation strategy in this study only captures a discrete series break in 
abortion laws. One potential problem with this methodology is that it may confound pre-existing 
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response to the regime change, the four model specifications were modified to include dummies 
for the ‘strict’ abortion law having been effective for up to two years and the ‘liberal’ abortion 
law having been in place for up to three years. These dummies capture the dynamic response of 
marriage rates to abortion law changes while the country-specific trends identify pre-existing 
trends. 
Tables A8 to A10 of the Appendix report the dynamics of abortion law changes where 
the reforms are allowed to have time-varying effects. As with the ‘discrete jump approach’ 
adopted in the initial analysis, the specifications all include year and country fixed effects, as 
well as country-specific linear and quadratic trends. The results are broadly similar to those 
obtained from the discrete jump approach with the strongest effects being observed for the 
‘liberal’ abortion law dummies. 
Yet, there are noticeable differences across the age groups under study. Table A9 shows 
that making abortion available upon request has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
marriage rates for females aged between 25 and 29 during the first year of reform, but the 
magnitude of the effect diminishes by the end of the first three years. The results for those aged 
between 30 and 44 from the discrete jump approach were not always robust to the inclusion of 
country-specific trends. However, as Tables A9 and A10, the coefficient on the ‘liberal’ abortion 
law dummy is positive and statistically significant across all specifications during the three years 
following reform. For example, the effect of making abortion available on request for 35 to 39 
year-olds is estimated at 3.48 to 6.00 female marriages per 1000 women and at 0.69 to 1.57 
marriages for 40 to 44 year-olds.      
  24  In summary, the robustness checks and dynamic specifications examined in this section 
appear to support the main findings of this study: a switch to a more liberal abortion law regime 
is associated with an increase in marriage rates for non-teenage females.       
 
4. Conclusions  
In recent years, a growing number of studies have begun to examine the ways in which 
access to abortion might affect various social and economic phenomena. Whilst the study by 
Donohue and Levitt (2001) exploring the relationship between abortion legalization and crime 
rates in the United States is undoubtedly the most well-known and controversial, several studies 
have also indicated that the availability of abortion may change the sexual behaviour of women. 
In turn, this has ramifications for other related issues such as the prevalence of sexually 
transmitted diseases and incidence of ‘shotgun weddings’. Much of this work focuses upon the 
United States, where a variety of policy changes affecting abortion access have occurred over the 
past four decades. However, there have also been significant changes in abortion policy in other 
parts of the world, most notably in Eastern Europe, and this study is the first of its kind to 
investigate how adoption of new abortion laws in the region may have affected female entry into 
marriage. Eastern Europe provides an extremely useful environment in which to undertake the 
analysis since the changes in abortion policy that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
were both extensive and varied.  
Previous studies from the United States had found that liberalization of abortion laws is 
associated with a decline in the marriage rate among females. Akerlof et al. (1996), for instance, 
theorized that, as a precondition for marital sex, a woman is no longer able to insist upon a 
marriage promise in the event of pregnancy, while a man feels less obligated to marry his partner 
  25  under these circumstances given that fertility is now a decision on her part. Our study proposed 
that the liberalization of abortion laws has the potential to raise female marriage rates since it 
lowers the cost to a woman of using pregnancy as a mechanism to screen ‘Dads’ from ‘Cads’. 
The empirical analysis that followed revealed that the movement from an abortion regime with 
only moderate restrictions to one in which abortion is available upon request appeared to raise 
marriage rates among non-teenage females in Eastern Europe. Although it would be bold to 
claim that the majority of women adopted this strategy across the region, the results for those 
aged 25 to 29 in particular were sufficiently robust to suggest that there is a possible role for this 
competing theory of abortion access and marriage.   
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Figure 2     First marriage rates for 25-29 year-old females in countries that did not liberalize 
abortion laws during the 1980 to 1997 period   
 
Figure 3      First marriage rates for 25-29 year-old females in countries that liberalized 
abortion laws during the 1980 to 1997 period   
 
 Table 1   Weighted average values of outcome measures, by region 
          Eastern Europe      Western Europe   
 
  1980        1995 1980 1995
       
Female marriage rate (per 1000 women):         
Aged 15-19  334.5  261.8  153.2  33.3 
Aged  20-24          398.7 338.5 382.8 196.7
Aged 25-29  101.7  90.7  137.3  228.1 
Aged  30-34          30.9 23.8 34.1 82.4
Aged 35-39  27.9  9.2  12.1  25.1 
Aged  40-44          5.1 4.3 6.1 7.8
 

















  31  Table 2  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable   Mean  S.E.  Min.  Max. 
        
Female first marriage rate (15-19 year-olds)  266.5  116.6  17.0  580.0 
Female first marriage rate (20-24 year-olds)  412.9  95.9  176.0  577.0 
Female first marriage rate (25-29 year-olds)  97.1  21.4  61.0  163.0 
Female first marriage rate (30-34 year-olds)  26.4  7.1  15.0  45.0 
Female first marriage rate (35-39 year-olds)  10.1  3.6  5.0  21.0 
Female first marriage rate (40-44 year-olds)  4.9  2.4  2.0  15.0 
Legal to save mother’s life or for other specific medical reasons  0.06  0.2  0  1 
Available upon request  0.7  0.4  0  1 
Log GDP per capita  10.3  1.3  7.9  13.2 
Inflation between 5% and 25%  0.3  0.4  0  1 
Inflation between 25% and 100%  0.1  0.3  0  1 
Female enrolment in university education   14.7  15.0  0  52.8 
Urbanization   64.1  9.1  41.7  79.0 
Female to male population ratio (15-44 years-old)  0.98  0.02  0.91  1.16 
Female to male population ratio (15-19 years-old)  0.95  0.01  0.90  1.00 
Female to male population ratio (20-24 years-old)  0.95  0.02  0.87  1.07 
Female to male population ratio (25-29 years-old)  0.97  0.02  0.91  1.07 
Female to male population ratio (30-34 years-old)  1.03  0.61  0.93  9.73 
Female to male population ratio (35-39 years-old)  1.01  0.03  0.93  1.12 
Female to male population ratio (40-44 years-old)  1.04  0.04  0.94  1.14 
Restrictive divorce laws   0.15  0.36  0  1 
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  (1)        (2) (3) (4)
        
Abortion laws         
Legal to save mother’s life or for other specific 
medical reasons 
a
       17.6 (14.8)         12.2 (19.1)       0.71 (17.2)        11.2 (17.4) 
Available upon request 
a  -53.7 (13.5)***         21.5 (11.0)**       4.27 (11.7)       -51.8 (16.7)***   
Macroeconomic conditions         
Log GDP per capita         0.005 (0.003)       0.03 (0.004)***        0.02 (0.003)***         0.02 (0.01)**       
Inflation between 5% and 25% 
b       29.4 (10.1)***        10.4 (6.63)        2.08 (5.88)       35.7 (11.2)***   
Inflation between 25% and 100% 
b       33.1 (16.0)**         19.6 (11.4)*       11.5 (10.5)       32.3 (15.2)***  
Inflation greater than 100% 
b 70.1 (19.3)***        46.8 (13.1)***       34.5 (11.6)***       69.1 (17.7)*** 
Economic and social development         
Female enrolment in university education              0.15 (0.34)      
Urbanization              7.64 (3.53)**  
Marriage market conditions         
Female to male population ratio (15-19)            829.3 (367.8)** 
Restrictive divorce laws 
c            -20.8 (15.5) 
        
Country-specific linear trends   No  Yes  No  No 
Country-specific quadratic trends    No  No  Yes  No 
R
2 0.87        0.96 0.96 0.91
Sample size   208  208  208  172 
 
The dependent variable is the first female marriage rate per 1000 women aged 15-19. All models include county and year fixed effects and dummy 
variables indicating whether GDP and inflation data are missing. They are also weighted by the size of the relevant population. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
a omitted category is ‘legal for medical or social reasons’, 
b omitted category is ‘inflation 
less than 5%’, 
c omitted category is unrestrictive divorce laws.     
 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.10 (two-tailed tests, under H0: β = 0) 
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  (1)        (2) (3) (4)
       
Abortion laws        
Legal to save mother’s life or for other 
specific medical reasons 
a
       -0.19 (15.3)         -22.6 (16.9)      -6.33 (17.2)      -34.5 (12.6)*** 
Available upon request 
a      62.2 (9.48)***          22.4 (10.7)***       41.5 (11.5)***       17.5 (9.24)*  
Macroeconomic conditions         
Log GDP per capita        -0.003 (0.003)         0.01 (0.01)       3E-04 (0.005)         0 .04 (0.007)*** 
Inflation between 5% and 25% 
b      -20.8 (8.55)***         0.64 (8.27)      -0.94 (8.81)      -4.61 (6.60) 
Inflation between 25% and 100% 
b      -1.23 (13.4)         9.38 (11.5)      11.2 (12.2)      -9.29 (8.27) 
Inflation greater than 100% 
b       14.6 (14.4)         28.1 (12.7)**       33.2 (13.1)***       0.84 (11.2) 
Economic and social development         
Female enrolment in university education             -0.47 (0.22)** 
Urbanization              6.95 (1.73)*** 
Marriage market conditions         
Female to male population ratio (20-24)            -304.2 (151.4)**  
Restrictive divorce laws 
c             -13.5 (10.3) 
        
Country-specific linear trends   No  Yes  No  No 
Country-specific quadratic trends    No  No  Yes  No 
R
2 0.90        0.94 0.93 0.94
Sample size   208  208  208  172 
 
The dependent variable is the first female marriage rate per 1000 women aged 20-24. All models include county and year fixed effects and dummy 
variables indicating whether GDP and inflation data are missing. They are also weighted by the size of the relevant population. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
a omitted category is ‘legal for medical or social reasons’, 
b omitted category is ‘inflation 
less than 5%’, 
c omitted category is unrestrictive divorce laws.     
 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.10 (two-tailed tests, under H0: β = 0) 
  34  Table 5    OLS estimates of the effect of abortion laws on first marriage rates of females aged 25-29 in Eastern Europe  
 
  (1)        (2) (3) (4)
       
Abortion laws        
Legal to save mother’s life or for other 
specific medical reasons 
a
      -0.06 (3.65)          0.14 (5.13)      -0.93 (4.56)    -8.88 (4.18)** 
Available upon request 
a    27.7 (3.69)***          9.46 (3.40)***       16.8 (4.08)***     15.0 (3.80)*** 
Macroeconomic conditions         
Log GDP per capita         0.008 (0.001)***         0.002 (0.002)      0.005 (0.001)***       0.01 (0.003)*** 
Inflation between 5% and 25% 
b      -8.36 (2.92)***        -1.94 (2.79)       -2.63 (2.89)    -7.32 (2.78)*** 
Inflation between 25% and 100% 
b      -3.44 (4.04)           4.29 (3.60)       4.35 (3.74)    -7.61 (3.63)** 
Inflation greater than 100% 
b      -4.97 (4.34)          5.08 (3.67)       5.28 (3.89)    -9.48 (3.86)*** 
Economic and social development         
Female enrolment in university education           -0.28 (5.34)*** 
Urbanization           -1.51 (0.84)**  
Marriage market conditions         
Female to male population ratio (25-29)           309.6 (82.3)*** 
Restrictive divorce laws 
c            1.15 (3.07) 
        
Country-specific linear trends   No  Yes  No  No 
Country-specific quadratic trends    No  No  Yes  No 
R
2 0.79        0.89 0.87 0.85
Sample size   208  208  208  172 
 
The dependent variable is the first female marriage rate per 1000 women aged 25-29. All models include county and year fixed effects and dummy 
variables indicating whether GDP and inflation data are missing. They are also weighted by the size of the relevant population. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
a omitted category is ‘legal for medical or social reasons’, 
b omitted category is ‘inflation 
less than 5%’, 
c omitted category is unrestrictive divorce laws.     
 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.10 (two-tailed tests, under H0: β = 0) 
  35  Table 6   OLS estimates of the effect of abortion laws on first marriage rates of females aged 30-34 in Eastern Europe  
 
  (1)        (2) (3) (4)
       
Abortion laws        
Legal to save mother’s life or for other 
specific medical reasons 
a
        1.39 (0.95)          1.85 (1.22)       0.83 (1.07)      -2.38 (1.25)**  
Available upon request 
a      6.53 (0.92)***          0.89 (0.88)       2.73 (1.07)***       3.15 (0.90)*** 
Macroeconomic conditions         
Log GDP per capita       0.003 (4E-04)***       0.001 (5E-04)***      0.002 (4E-04)***      0.006 (8E-04)*** 
Inflation between 5% and 25% 
b       -0.47 (0.66)         0.16 (0.65)        0.19 (0.69)      -0.25 (0.64)  
Inflation between 25% and 100% 
b        0.35 (1.02)          1.44 (0.96)*       1.74 (1.04)*      -0.76 (1.10) 
Inflation greater than 100% 
b        0.12 (1.09)         1.64 (0.98)*       1.94 (1.07)*      -1.67 (1.13)  
Economic and social development         
Female enrolment in university education             -0.07 (0.02)***  
Urbanization             -0.42 (0.18)** 
Marriage market conditions         
Female to male population ratio (30-34)              0.26 (0.12)** 
Restrictive divorce laws 
c               1.76 (1.00)* 
        
Country-specific linear trends   No  Yes  No  No 
Country-specific quadratic trends    No  No  Yes  No 
R
2 0.87        0.92 0.90 0.91
Sample size   208  208  208  172 
 
The dependent variable is the first female marriage rate per 1000 women aged 30-34. All models include county and year fixed effects and dummy 
variables indicating whether GDP and inflation data are missing. They are also weighted by the size of the relevant population. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
a omitted category is ‘legal for medical or social reasons’, 
b omitted category is ‘inflation 
less than 5%’, 
c omitted category is unrestrictive divorce laws.     
 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.10 (two-tailed tests, under H0: β = 0) 
  36  Table 7    OLS estimates of the effect of abortion laws on first marriage rates of females aged 35-39 in Eastern Europe  
 
  (1)        (2) (3) (4)
       
Abortion laws        
Legal to save mother’s life or for other 
specific medical reasons 
a
       1.09 (0.38)***          0.92 (0.46)**       0.70 (0.42)*       -0.80 (0.57) 
Available upon request 
a    2.57 (0.42)***         -0.14 (0.33)       0.42 (0.42)        1.04 (0.43)*** 
Macroeconomic conditions         
Log GDP per capita       9E-04 (1E-04)***        4E-04 (1E-04)      7E-04(1E-05)***      0.002 (4-E04)*** 
Inflation between 5% and 25% 
b        0.02 (0.31)         0.17 (0.32)        0.29 (0.35)       -0.12 (0.35) 
Inflation between 25% and 100% 
b        0.07 (0.51)          0.35 (0.50)       0.58 (0.54)       -0.32 (0.55) 
Inflation greater than 100% 
b        0.70 (0.86)         0.57 (0.52)       0.81 (0.57)       -0.71 (0.62) 
Economic and social development         
Female enrolment in university education             -0.02 (0.008)*** 
Urbanization             -0.13 (0.08) 
Marriage market conditions         
Female to male population ratio (35-39)            -9.65 (16.1) 
Restrictive divorce laws 
c              1.24 (0.48)***  
        
Country-specific linear trends   No  Yes  No  No 
Country-specific quadratic trends    No  No  Yes  No 
R
2 0.91        0.93 0.92 0.92
Sample size   208  208  208  172 
 
The dependent variable is the first female marriage rate per 1000 women aged 35-39. All models include county and year fixed effects and dummy 
variables indicating whether GDP and inflation data are missing. They are also weighted by the size of the relevant population. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
a omitted category is ‘legal for medical or social reasons’, 
b omitted category is ‘inflation 
less than 5%’, 
c omitted category is unrestrictive divorce laws.     
 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.10 (two-tailed tests, under H0: β = 0) 
  37  Table 8   OLS estimates of the effect of abortion laws on first marriage rates of females aged 40-44 in Eastern Europe  
 
  (1)        (2) (3) (4)
       
Abortion laws        
Legal to save mother’s life or for other 
specific medical reasons 
a
       0.65 (0.26)***        -0.17 (0.35)      -0.09 (0.31)       -0.64 (0.35)* 
Available upon request 
a         1.71 (0.29)***        -0.28 (0.21)       0.15 (0.25)        0.81 (0.26)*** 
Macroeconomic conditions         
Log GDP per capita       5E-04 (1E-04)***      2E-04 (1E-04)**      4E-04 (1E-04)***     0.001 (2E-04)*** 
Inflation between 5% and 25% 
b        0.25 (0.20)        0.39 (0.18)**       0.49 (0.19)***        0.23 (0.22)  
Inflation between 25% and 100% 
b        0.28 (0.31)         0.54 (0.28)**      0.72 (0.29)***        0.18 (0.33) 
Inflation greater than 100% 
b        0.20 (0.37)        0.74 (0.30)***      0.94 (0.32)***       -0.14 (0.37) 
Economic and social development         
Female enrolment in university education             -0.01 (0.006)** 
Urbanization             -0.16 (0.06)***    
Marriage market conditions         
Female to male population ratio (40-44)             -7.61 (6.42) 
Restrictive divorce laws 
c               0.69 (0.25)*** 
        
Country-specific linear trends                No               Yes            No      No 
Country-specific quadratic trends                 No                No           Yes   No 
R
2             0.87               0.93          0.93  0.91 
Sample size               208               208          208    172 
 
The dependent variable is the first female marriage rate per 1000 women aged 40-44. All models include county and year fixed effects and dummy 
variables indicating whether GDP and inflation data are missing. They are also weighted by the size of the relevant population. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
a omitted category is ‘legal for medical or social reasons’, 
b omitted category is ‘inflation 
less than 5%’, 
c omitted category is unrestrictive divorce laws.     
 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.10 (two-tailed tests, under H0: β = 0) 
  38  APPENDIX 
 
Table A1  Abortion Laws in Eastern Europe (1980-1997) 
 
Country    Years
Legalized 










           
Bulgaria 1973-1989  Legal for medical reasons or on request in the first 10 weeks of pregnancy for certain categories of women, like those with 2 or more 
children    1990 -  
Legal on request in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy  
Medical/Social 







Czech Republic    1957-1986 
1987 -  
Legal for maternal health or social reasons in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy  









Estonia   1955 -   Legal on request in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy following consultation with doctor and notification of possible adverse consequences    On request   Y  Y  N 
GDR 1972-1992  Legal on request in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy  
1993 -   Legal in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy after mandatory counselling and a 3-day waiting period; procedure is subsidised in majority of 









Hungary   1973-1992 
1993 - 
Legal for medical reasons or on request in first 12 weeks of pregnancy for certain categories of women, like those with 3 or more children  
Legal in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy after counselling and a 3-day waiting period      
Medical/Social 
On request 
    
Latvia  1955-   Legal on request in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy following consultation with doctor and notification of possible adverse consequences    On request   Y  Y  N 
Lithuania  1955-   Legal on request in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy following consultation with doctor and notification of possible adverse consequences    On request   Y  Y  N 
Moldova  1955-   Legal on request in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy following consultation with doctor and notification of possible adverse consequences    On request   Y  Y  N 
Poland   1956-1992 
1993 -  
Legal in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy for medical and social reasons 
Legal only when the pregnancy threatens the mother’s life or health or in cases of rape/incest or foetal defects   
Medical/Social 







Romania 1966-1989  Legal in very limited circumstances (mother’s life, rape, very large family, and the like) 
1990 -   Legal on request in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy  
Life/Medical 







Russia  1955-   Legal on request in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy following consultation with doctor and notification of possible adverse consequences    On request   Y  Y  N 
Slovak Republic  1957-1986 
1987 -  
Legal for maternal health or social reasons in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy  









Source: Levine and Staiger (2004)  
 
  39   
Table A2  Change in real GDP per capita in Eastern Europe (1980-1997) 
 
Country  1980-84 (% change)  1985-88 (% change)  1989-92 (% change) 1993 -97 (% change)
Bulgaria         8.6 22.3 -19.8 -10.7
Czech Republic  5.8  4.6  -20.3  14.8 
Estonia         10.4 5.4 -31.5 23.4
Germany (GDR)
1         4.3 14.3 30.8
Hungary         7.1 6.9 -16.9 12.3
Latvia   11.9  9.5  -41.5  15.2 
Lithuania
2 5.1        14.1 -19.8 3.9
Moldova          17.1 8.3 -42.9 -36.1
Poland   3.3  8.7  -16.5  27.0 
Romania          15.7 -4.6 -23.9 9.1
Russia          5.5 5.3 -21.8 -17.8
Slovak Republic















1 missing data for 1980-84 and 1997 
2 missing data for 1980 
 
Source: World Bank and CIA. 
 
  40  Table A3  Inflation rates in Eastern Europe (1980-1997) 
 
Country   less than 5%  between 5%-25%  between 25%-100%  greater than 100% missing data 
Bulgaria  1980-88  1989  1992-95  1991, 1996-97  1980, 1990 
Czech Republic  1981-89  1990, 1992-97  1991    1980 
Estonia  1981-85, 1987-88  1986, 1989-90,1996-97  1993-95  1991-92  1980 
Germany (GDR)  1981-89, 1994-97  1992-93      1980, 1990-91 
Hungary  1981  1980, 1982-1989, 1992-94, 1996-97  1990-91, 1995     
Latvia   1981-85, 1987-88  1986, 1989-90, 1996-97  1994, 1995  1991-93  1980 
Lithuania  1981-85  1986, 1989-90, 1996-97  1987-88, 1994-95  1991-93  1980 
Moldova  1981-85, 1987-88  1986, 1989-90, 1996-97  1991, 1995  1992-94  1980 
Poland     1980-81, 1984-86, 1996-97  1983, 1987-88, 1991-95  1982, 1989-90   
Romania  1984-88  1981-83, 1989-90  1995-96  1991-94, 1997  1980 
Russia  1980-84, 1986-87  1985, 1988-90, 1997  1996  1991-95   
Slovak Republic  1981-89  1990, 1992-97  1991    1980 
 
Source: World Bank and CIA.  
 
  41  Table A4   Percentage of Females Aged 20-24 Enrolled in University Education in Eastern Europe (1980 and 1995) 
 
Country   1980  1995  % change 
Bulgaria        18.5 51.9 180.9
Czech Republic   14.0  21.2  51.5 
Estonia        25.5 40.4 58.6
Germany (GDR)
1 36.1      - -
Hungary        12.6 26.9 113.8
Latvia        28.1 29.8 6.1
Lithuania
2 44.6      32.6 -26.7
Moldova
3 -      35.6 -
Poland        20.1 29.3 45.9
Romania        9.5 23.9 150.9
Russia
4 51.5      - -
Slovak Republic
5 -      21.1 -
 
 
1 Data only available for 1980-1988, 
2 1980-1984 missing (1985 used), 
3 Data only available for 1994-1996, 
4 Data only available for 
1980-1986, 
5 Data only available for 1992-1996  
 
Source: UNESCO (various years)   
 
  42  Table A5  Urbanization in Eastern Europe (1982 and 1997) 
 
Country   1982  1997  % change 
Bulgaria        63.9 67.7 +5.9
Czech Republic   73.7  74.7  1.4 
Estonia        70.8 69.3 -2.1
Germany (GDR)
1 76.5      76.3 -0.3
Hungary        57.3 63.8 +11.3
Latvia        69.9 69.1 -1.1
Lithuania        63.3 68.3 +7.9
Moldova
2 42.8      41.7 -2.6
Poland        59.3 61.9 +4.4
Romania        48.5 55.0 +13.4
Russia
3 71.6      72.9 +1.8
Slovak Republic
4 53.0      57.0 +7.5
 
1 1991-97 missing (1990 used), 
2 1980-83 missing (1984 used), 
3 1980-83 missing (1984 used), 
4 1980-82 missing (1983 used) 
 
Source: United Nations Demographic Yearbook (various years)  
 
  43     Table A6    Female-to-male population ratios in Eastern Europe (1980 and 1996) 
 
  15-44              15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
  1980      1996  1980      1996  1980        1996  1980       1996  1980        1996  1980       1996  1980       1996 
          
Bulgaria  0.97       0.98     0.94       0.94  0.95         0.96     0.98        0.96   0.98         0.98   0.99         1.00     1.00        1.02 
Czech Republic  0.97       0.96      0.95       0.95  0.96         0.95  0.97        0.95  0.97         0.96  0.99         0.97  1.00        0.99 
Estonia  0.98       0.99  0.90       0.96  0.92         0.97  0.96        0.91  1.02         0.99  1.04         1.04  1.08        1.08 
Germany (GDR)*  0.96       0.91  0.95       0.92  0.94         0.87  0.94        0.91  0.96         0.93  0.99         0.93  0.99        0.94 
Hungary   0.98       0.97   0.94       0.95  0.96         0.95   0.97        0.96  0.98         0.97  1.00         1.00  1.09        1.09 
Latvia  1.00       0.99  0.93       0.97   0.94         0.96   0.99        0.93  1.02         0.99    1.05         1.04  1.09        1.09 
Lithuania  1.00       0.99   0.92       0.97  0.95         0.97  0.99        0.95  1.04         0.98      1.06         1.03  1.11        1.07 
Moldova*  1.06       1.03  0.98       0.97  1.07         0.99  1.06        1.02   1.08         1.07     1.11         1.06  1.14        1.08  
Poland  0.97       0.97  0.94       0.95  0.95         0.96    0.97        0.95  0.98         0.97  1.00         0.99  1.02        1.00 
Romania  0.98       0.97  0.95       0.95  0.96         0.95  0.97        0.97  0.98         0.97   1.00         0.99  1.01        1.00 
Russia  0.99       0.98  0.94       0.97  0.96         0.94  0.94        0.97   0.98         0.98   1.04         1.01  1.06        1.03 
Slovak Republic   0.98       0.97  0.96       0.94  0.94         0.96  0.96        0.96  0.96         0.98  1.03         0.97  1.06        0.99 
* figures are 1994 for 1996.  
 Source: Council of Europe  
 
  44  Table A7  Divorce Laws in Eastern Europe  
 
Country   Divorce legislation 
Bulgaria  From 1968-1985: Breakdown or other less restrictive; Since 1985: Fault or other restrictive   
Czech Republic   From 1950-1964: Fault or other restrictive; From 1964- 1998: Breakdown or other less restrictive 
Estonia  Until 1966: Fault or other restrictive; Since 1966: Breakdown or other less restrictive  
Germany (GDR)  From 1949-1990: Breakdown or other less restrictive; Since 1990, more restrictive  
Hungary  Until 1964: Fault or other restrictive; Since 1964: Breakdown or other less restrictive 
Latvia  Until 1966: Fault or other restrictive; Since 1966: Breakdown or other less restrictive 
Lithuania  Until 1966: Fault or other restrictive; Since 1966: Breakdown or other less restrictive 
Moldova  Until 1966: Fault or other restrictive; Since 1966: Breakdown or other less restrictive 
Poland  Until 1964: Fault or other restrictive; Since 1964: Breakdown or other less restrictive 
Romania  From 1966-1993: Fault or other restrictive; Since 1993: Breakdown or other less restrictive   
Russia  Until 1966: Fault or other restrictive; Since 1966: Breakdown or other less restrictive 
Slovak Republic  From 1950-1964: Fault or other restrictive; From 1964- 1998: Breakdown or other less restrictive 
 
Sources: Martiny and Schwab (2003), Todorova (2003), Antokolskaia (2003), Weiss and Szeibert (2003), Maczynski and Sokolowski 
(2003), Harkonen and Dronkers (2006), the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, and direct correspondence with legal 
experts in Eastern Europe. 




  15-19                15-19 15-19 15-19 20-24 20-24 20-24 20-24
  (1)                (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Strict abortion law 

















Strict abortion law 

















On request abortion law 

















On request abortion law 

















On request abortion law 

















              
Country-specific linear 
trends 
N                Y N N N N Y N
Country-specific 
quadratic trends 




0.88                0.96 0.96 0.90 0.90 0.94 0.93 0.94
F-statistic (strict)  0.41  0.12  0.06            0.44 0.47 3.81** 1.01 6.79***
F-statistic (on request)  18.5***  6.64***            0.03 7.41*** 50.8*** 0.99 7.42*** 2.42 
Sample size 
 
208                208 208 208 208 208 208 172
 
The dependent variables are first female marriage rate per 1000 women for each age group. All models include county and year fixed effects and dummy 
variables indicating whether GDP and inflation data are missing. They are also weighted by the size of the relevant population. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The omitted abortion law category is ‘legal for medical or social reasons’.  
    *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.10 (two-tailed tests, under H0: β = 0) 
 
  46  Table A9    OLS estimates of the (dynamic) effect of abortion laws on first marriage rates of females in Eastern Europe 
 
    25-29                25-29 25-29 25-29 30-34 30-34 30-34 30-34
  (1)                (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Strict abortion law 

















Strict abortion law 

















On request abortion 
law effective for 1 yr 
















On request abortion 

















On request abortion 



















               
Country-specific linear 
trends 
N                Y N N N N N N
Country-specific 
quadratic trends 




0.80                0.89 0.87 0.85 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.93
F-statistic (strict)  0.36  1.49              1.18 7.31*** 1.18 0.37 0.14 0.50
F-statistic (on request)  93.1***  6.54**
* 





























The dependent variables are first female marriage rate per 1000 women for each age group. All models include county and year fixed effects and dummy 
variables indicating whether GDP and inflation data are missing. They are also weighted by the size of the relevant population. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The omitted abortion law category is ‘legal for medical or social reasons’.  
    *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.10 (two-tailed tests, under H0: β = 0) 
 
  47  Table A10    OLS estimates of the (dynamic) effect of abortion laws on first marriage rates of females in Eastern Europe 
  
    35-39                35-39 35-39 35-39 40-44 40-44 40-44 40-44
  (1)                (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Strict abortion law 

















Strict abortion law 

















On request abortion 

















On request abortion 

















On request abortion 

















            
Country-specific linear 
trends 
N                Y N N N Y N N
Country-specific 
quadratic trends 




0.93                0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.92
F-statistic (strict)  9.97***  3.52*              3.31* 0.50 8.49*** 0.02 0.21 1.36
F-statistic (on request)  75.0***  40.4***  16.3***            20.7*** 72.7*** 4.27** 18.0*** 34.1***
Sample size 
 























The dependent variables are first female marriage rate per 1000 women for each age group. All models include county and year fixed effects and dummy 
variables indicating whether GDP and inflation data are missing. They are also weighted by the size of the relevant population. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The omitted abortion law category is ‘legal for medical or social reasons’.  
    *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.10 (two-tailed tests, under H0: β = 0) 
  48  